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One of the first things one learns as a social psychologist is that everyone is capable of
bias. We simply are not, and cannot be, all knowing and completely objective. Our
understandings and views of the world are partial, and reflect the circumstances of our
particular lives. This is where a discipline like science comes in. . . . [I]t extends what
we can see and understand, while constraining bias.
—Claude M. Steele1

* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University, Maurer School of Law. I am grateful to Jerry Kang,
Kevin Brown, Jeannine Bell, Deborah Widiss, Tim Lovelace, and Will Rhee for providing helpful
comments on this Article.
1. CLAUDE M. STEELE, WHISTLING VIVALDI AND OTHER CLUES TO HOW STEREOTYPES
AFFECT US 13–14 (2010).
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INTRODUCTION
symposium2

This
addresses whether critical race theory (CRT) may benefit
from a more robust engagement with empirical methods: Might empirical
methods, drawn from a range of social science disciplines, be marshaled to explore
the insights and advance the lessons of CRT?3 Over the past decade, a growing
body of interdisciplinary research has shown the value and versatility of applying
empirical methods to explore questions posed by CRT. This union of CRT and
empirical methods has been aptly named “critical race empiricism.”4 While the
harvest of interdisciplinary research is vast, this Article emphasizes a growing body
of scholarship, known as “behavioral realism,”5 and a promising intersection of
law and social psychology that explores implicit bias throughout the law.
Moreover, the Article examines how critical race empiricism—and law and social
psychology, in particular—can be harnessed to study the claims of CRT.
In this Article, I first discuss why social psychology offers a fertile source for
both theory and methods to explore CRT. Drawing on social-psychological theory
and methods, I then conduct an empirical legal study of judicial decision making
under the U.S. Supreme Court’s new, highly subjective pleading standard.6
Although one of my previous projects yielded similar findings,7 I have updated my
empirical legal analysis in three ways. First, I have extended the time horizon from
eighteen months to twenty-four months, increasing the sample size of cases I

2. This symposium would not have been possible without sustained effort by many
committed scholars. I wish to thank, in particular, Osagie Obasogie, Joan Williams, Laura Gómez,
Devon Carbado, and Mario Barnes, who have assembled workshops at UC Davis and UC Irvine,
where critical race theorists and empiricists have engaged each other’s scholarship. These
conversations continued at the Law & Society Association’s 2012 annual meeting.
3. Several seminal collections of critical race theory offer insightful background. See, e.g.,
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2001);
CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberlé
Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995); CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY
(Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002).
4. See Devon W. Carbado, Afterword: Critical What What?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1593, 1638 (2011).
5. Behavioral realism is a far-reaching means of inquiry, which bears an impulse of naturalism,
that explores gaps between a scientific consensus and untested folk wisdom incorporated and
subsumed into law. The scientific consensus may arise in a variety of social science disciplines,
including evolutionary biology, behavioral genetics, and psychology. “Behavioral realism” as used in
this Article emerged from a symposium in July 2006 discussing how advances in social and cognitive
sciences offer new jurisprudential perspectives. See generally Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through
Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010). After the symposium, jurists and
social psychologists produced several noteworthy articles. See BEYOND COMMON SENSE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (Eugene Borgida & Susan T. Fiske eds., 2008);
Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit
Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006). For an additional discussion, see Victor D.
Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A Social-Psychological Study of Iqbal’s Effect on Claims of Race
Discrimination, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2011).
6. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).
7. See Quintanilla, supra note 5, at 30–42.
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analyze, and thereby increasing the power of my study.8 Second, I now compare
and contrast how White and Black judges apply both the old and new pleading
standards. This comparison offers a baseline to evaluate whether the new pleading
standard produces differences in how White and Black judges decide motions to
dismiss Black plaintiffs’ claims of race discrimination.9 Third, to assess whether
the race of federal judges predicts how they apply the new pleading standard, I
conducted multiple and sequential regressions, which pitted judges’ race against
their political ideology.10
This enhanced empirical legal study supports the conclusion that the new
pleading standard serves as a context for aversive racism, implicit bias, and lay
theories of racism to operate against stereotyped-group members who assert
claims of discrimination. Under notice pleading, White and Black judges decided
discrimination claims similarly; yet under plausibility pleading, White and Black
judges decided these claims differently. White judges were much more likely to
dismiss the claims of stereotyped-group members, even after controlling for
political ideology. This strongly suggests that, because plausibility pleading requires
judges to draw on their “judicial experience and common sense,”11 federal judges
are drawing on their lay theories of discrimination, their priors, their schemas, and
their stereotypes when judging the plausibility of discrimination claims. These
findings also suggest that implicit bias is operating against Black plaintiffs. This
empirical study is but one of many means to harness empirical methods to explore
CRT. The study, moreover, illustrates how infusing CRT with empirical legal
methods illuminates implicit bias in legal decision making and the process by
which race and law interact.
CRT is an intellectual movement that challenges how race and racial
hierarchies are constructed and represented in legal culture and society.12 CRT
scholars examine the relationships between race, racism, law, and power13 and
advance a normative framework that critiques the social and legal status quo.14 As
a descriptive matter, CRT scholars tend to agree on a cluster of claims about how
race, racism, and law operate in American society. Many of these claims are
empirical in nature.15 By calling these core claims “empirical,” I mean that they
connect with concrete experience.16 Chief among these core claims is that racism
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.B.
11. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
12. See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT,
supra note 3, at xiii (providing an excellent compilation of early articles that relate to CRT).
13. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 2000); Carbado, supra note 4, at 1607–15.
14. See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, supra note 12.
15. I thank Devon Carbado for sharing his reflections on this point at the Law & Society
Association’s June 2012 annual meeting.
16. See ABRAHAM KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY: METHODOLOGY FOR

UCILR V3I2 Assembled v8.7 (Do Not Delete)

190

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

1/22/2014 4:12 PM

[Vol. 3:187

persists in American society and that racism is a pressing problem,
notwithstanding the prevailing rhetoric that Americans are colorblind.17 In short,
racism and discrimination are common and ordinary, not aberrational.18 A second
claim is that race and racism are socially constructed—products of law, social
thought, social institutions, and social interactions19—rather than fixed biological
categories.20 A third claim is that whiteness confers latitude, leeway, and privilege21
on majority-group members not bestowed on stereotyped-group members. A final
empirical claim is the intersectionality thesis—that identities compound and are
potentially conflicting, that no person has a single unitary identity.22 Although
these claims are empirical in nature, CRT scholars have tended to draw upon legal
storytelling and narrative analysis,23 often leaving empirical legal methods
unexplored, though this appears to be changing.24 Through narrative and
storytelling, communities of color voice authentic accounts from their own
perspectives and experiences. As Margaret Montoya sagely noted, racialized stories
provide new metaphors, nuances, inspirations, and common images, and play a
role in healing and transformation.25 Even so, discovering and dismantling bias

BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE (2d ed. 1998). By grounding empiricism on concrete experience, I distinguish
the inquiry from sensationalism and a priori rationalism.
[This] emancipates us from the supposed need of always harking back to what has already
been given, something had by alleged direct or immediate knowledge in the past, for the
test of value of ideas. A definition of the nature of ideas in terms of operations to be
performed and the test of the validity of the ideas by the consequences of these operations
establishes connectivity with concrete experience.
4 JOHN DEWEY, THE LATER WORKS, 1925–1953, at 92 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1984).
17. See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 7; Gary Peller, Race
Consciousness, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT,
supra note 3, at 127.
18. See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 7; Gary Peller, Race
Consciousness, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT,
supra note 3, at 127.
19. See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 7–8; Carbado, supra
note 4, at 1610.
20. See DOING RACE: 21 ESSAYS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Hazel Rose Markus & Paula M.L.
Moya eds., 2010); Carbado, supra note 4, at 1609.
21. See Carbado, supra note 4, at 1637; Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1707, 1724 (1993).
22. See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 10; Kimberlé
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43
STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242–45 (1991).
23. See CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE, supra note 13, at 42–93;
CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 3, at 243–302.
24. See, e.g., Laura E. Gómez, Looking for Race in All the Wrong Places, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
221, 234–41 (2012); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory,
112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1797–1801 (2003) (reviewing CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW
CRITICAL RACE THEORY (2002)).
25. See Margaret E. Montoya, Celebrating Racialized Legal Narratives, in CROSSROADS,
DIRECTIONS, AND A NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 3, at 243.
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throughout the law will require that we harness a range of epistemological tools,
and empirical methods hold great potential to help us in this endeavor.
Ever dynamic, CRT has evolved over time.26 While CRT scholars tend to
agree on the cluster of claims I have described, CRT inquiry does not exalt a single
method nor require a particular method per se.27 Indeed, CRT inquiry has
borrowed concepts, laws, data, models, theories, methods, and explanations from
neighboring social science disciplines for its inquiries and investigations.28 This
symposium, for example, bridges a range of social science disciplines and reveals
how interdisciplinary methods—empirical, experimental, qualitative, and
quantitative—can be harnessed to enrich CRT.29 Like other contributors to this
symposium, I believe that empirical methods have yielded, and will continue to
yield, a harvest of new insights for CRT. In short, the revival of empirical methods
within the legal academy more generally poses a rare opportunity for CRT.30 New
technologies and sophisticated empirical methods now enable scholars to critically
examine race, racism, stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination as social
processes powerfully shaped by contexts and situations.31
I concur with Devon Carbado’s proposal: “[T]he time is ripe for ‘Critical
Race Empiricism.’”32 Indeed, critical race empiricism shares common ground with
behavioral realism, a process of inquiry that is underway and that has begun
dismantling the fiction of colorblindness. Behavioral realism harnesses a
naturalizing epistemology to critique colorblindness as inconsistent with what
26. See Carbado, supra note 4, at 1601–07; see also Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, The First
Decade: Critical Reflections, or “A Foot in the Closing Door,” 49 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1365–69 (2002);
Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical Race Theory and Related Scholarship,
84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 331 (2006).
27. See Carbado, supra note 4, at 1636.
28. See KAPLAN, supra note 16, at 4 (“[T]he domain of truth has no fixed boundaries within
it. . . . Some of the most exciting encounters in the history of science are those between workers in
what appear to be quite distinct fields who are suddenly brought face to face as a result of their
independent investigations. The autonomy of inquiry is in no way incompatible with the mature
dependency of the several sciences on one another.”); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 328–44 (1987).
29. See Laura E. Gómez, A Tale of Two Genres: On the Real and Ideal Links Between Law and Society
and Critical Race Theory (2004), reprinted in RACE, LAW AND SOCIETY 465, 468–69 (Ian Haney López
ed., 2007); Osagie K. Obasogie, Race in Law and Society: A Critique, in RACE, LAW AND SOCIETY, supra,
at 445, 446–47; Gregory Scott Parks, Toward a Critical Race Realism, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
683, 685 (2007).
30. See Howard Erlanger et al., Foreword: Is It Time for a New Legal Realism?, 2005 WIS. L. REV.
335, 339–45; Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: “Things Ain’t What They Used to
Be,” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365, 385–403; Mark C. Suchman & Elizabeth Mertz, Toward a New Legal
Empiricism: Empirical Legal Studies and New Legal Realism, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 555, 556–63
(2010).
31. While there are many such studies, I highlight two recent articles: Rachel Kahn Best et al.,
Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 991 (2011); Jean Braucher et al., Race, Attorney Influence, and Bankruptcy Chapter Choice, 9 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 393 (2012).
32. Carbado, supra note 4, at 1638.
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science has revealed about human behavior and modern prejudice.33 In so doing,
behavioral realism shows that implicit bias and unconscious racism have
ramifications and must be addressed across the law.34 This form of empiricism has
mobilized social-psychological theories and methods to show that the prevailing
antidiscrimination model, which focuses chiefly on intent, is underinclusive, as it
fails to address implicit bias and legal institutions that produce implicit bias.35
Where the naturalistic impulse of behavioral realism is harnessed to explore
empirical questions posed by CRT, critical race empiricism emerges. Critical race
empiricism enables scholars to explore how antidiscrimination law brings into
being, rather than dismantles, racial discrimination.36 By addressing primarily
intentional racism, antidiscrimination law grants majority-group members the
privilege to discriminate against stereotyped-group members in subtle and indirect
ways. Further, as Laura Gómez contends, empirical methods allow socio-legal
scholars to broaden the inquiry, moving beyond studying race as an independent
variable and enabling scholars to study race and racism as dependent variables.37
With ingenuity, new technologies and sophisticated empirical methods would
enable scholars to study how law shapes race, racism, and racial ideologies.38 So
too, empirical methods can be harnessed to reveal how law changes over time due
to race, racism, and racial ideologies.39
Over the past fifty years, social psychologists have developed theory and
methods that can be marshaled to conduct critical race empiricism. Since the
1950s and Gordon Allport’s celebrated text The Nature of Prejudice, the field of
social psychology has investigated stereotypes, prejudice, discrimination, and the
mechanisms underlying these societal ills.40 This Article focuses, in particular, on
two of these mechanisms: aversive racism and lay theories of discrimination.
Aversive racism differs from the blatant, “old-fashioned” racism; aversive racism

33. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, in NATURALIZING
JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 15, 31 (2007); W.V. QUINE, Naturalism; or, Living Within One’s Means, in QUINTESSENCE:
BASIC READINGS FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF W.V. QUINE 275 (Robert F. Gibson, Jr. ed., 1969);
Krieger & Fiske, supra note 5, at 1001.
34. See Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking and
Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 406–21 (2007).
35. See Kang & Lane, supra note 5, at 490–503.
36. See id.; Krieger & Fiske, supra note 5, at 1029–52; Obasogie, supra note 29, at 461–63;
Quintanilla, supra note 5.
37. See Gómez, supra note 24, at 231; Laura E. Gómez, Understanding Law and Race as Mutually
Constitutive: An Invitation to Explore an Emerging Field, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 487, 488, 499 (2010)
[hereinafter Gómez, Understanding Law].
38. See Gómez, supra note 24, at 236–41; Gómez, Understanding Law, supra note 37, at 499–501.
39. See Gómez, supra note 24, at 225–26; Gómez, Understanding Law, supra note 37, at 491–99;
Obasogie, supra note 29, at 461–63.
40. GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1979); see also John Harding et al.,
Prejudice and Ethnic Relations, in 5 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (Gardner Lindzey &
Elliot Aronson eds., 2d ed. 1969).
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is more indirect, subtle, and difficult to detect.41 Aversive racists support racial
equality in theory and believe themselves to be nonprejudiced, but at the same
time they hold negative, implicit attitudes and beliefs toward members of
stereotyped groups.42 The aversive racism framework predicts that implicit bias
emerges in ambiguous circumstances and situations—when, for example, people
apply highly subjective rules and malleable decision criteria.43 Lay theories of
racism illuminate how and why people decide whether discrimination occurred.44
Lay theories are organized knowledge structures, like schemas, that direct
behavior, judgments, and evaluations.45
While studies examining procedural rules and court practices have
proliferated,46 critical race empiricism contributes a missing dimension, providing
voice to claimants who are adversely affected by procedural rules and rule
reforms. In its early history, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee seldom drew on
empirical evidence when evaluating procedural rules.47 Now, however, the
Advisory Committee regularly consults with the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) and
coordinates with private research organizations to examine the effect of rules and
proposed rules.48 Rule reformers and social scientists now routinely employ

41. John F. Dovidio, Samuel L. Gaertner, and their colleagues have interrogated this
phenomenon. See John F. Dovidio, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The Third Wave, 57 J. SOC.
ISSUES 829, 833–35, 838 (2001); John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, New Directions in Aversive
Racism Research: Persistence and Pervasiveness, 53 NEB. SYMP. ON MOTIVATION 43, 44–45 (2008).
42. See Dovidio, supra note 41, at 835.
43. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 41, at 45–46.
44. Sam R. Sommers, Michael I. Norton, and their colleagues have examined this
phenomenon. See Sam R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Lay Theories About White Racists: What
Constitutes Racism (and What Doesn’t), 9 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 117, 118, 126–31
(2006); Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal Concepts, 61 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857 (1991).
45. Sommers & Norton, supra note 44, at 118.
46. See Will Rhee, Evidence-Based Federal Civil Rulemaking: A New Contemporaneous Case Coding
Rule, 33 PACE L. REV. 1, 21–30 (2012); Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research
in Civil Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1141–87 (2002).
47. Rhee, supra note 46, at 17–21; see also Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court
Rulemaking Procedure, 22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 323, 334–35 (1991); Maurice Rosenberg, The Impact of
Procedure-Impact Studies in the Administration of Justice, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 13 (1988)
(“Empirical research on the functioning of procedural rules has had a slowly growing impact on the
litigation process. . . . Regrettably, the examples of such impacts have not been numerous.”).
48. The FJC is an agency of the judicial branch of the federal government created by Congress
in 1967 to, among other purposes, “conduct research and study of the operation of the courts of the
United States, and to stimulate and coordinate such research and study on the part of other public
and private persons and agencies.” 28 U.S.C. § 620(b)(1) (2006). Congress also authorized the FJC, if
“consistent with the performance of the other functions set forth in this section, to provide staff,
research, and planning assistance to the Judicial Conference of the United States and its committees.”
Id. § 620(b)(4); see also Frank Easterbrook, A Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking: A Report from the
Subcommittee on Long Range Planning to the Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure and Evidence of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, 168 F.R.D. 679, 685 (1995); Russell R. Wheeler, Empirical Research and the
Politics of Judicial Administration: Creating the Federal Judicial Center, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31
(1988); Willging, supra note 46, at 1124–25.
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empirical methods to evaluate procedural rules.49 Rule reformers have studied cost
and delay, the adversarial nature of lawyering, the burdens of discovery, the
uniformity and neutrality of rules, and differences among case management
devices.50 But few have closely examined how rule regimes affect the litigation
prospects of stereotyped-group members or the degree to which the formulation
of rules serves as a context for implicit bias.51 The process concerns of critical race
empiricism differ from those studied by many researchers: critical race empiricism
would both directly investigate whether procedural rules adversely affect claimants
of stereotyped groups and interrogate whether proposed regimes permit implicit
bias to shape decisions.
This Article illustrates how critical race empiricism can be harnessed to
evaluate procedural rules by examining the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent shift in
pleading standards from notice pleading under Conley v. Gibson52 to plausibility
pleading in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.53 Others have offered excellent discussions of Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly54 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.55 Given their illuminating
discussions, I offer only a brief introduction here. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a) once operated as a minimal notice-pleading rule, requiring plaintiffs to set
forth a “short and plain” statement of their claim.56 In Twombly57 and then in
49.
50.
51.

See Erlanger et al., supra note 30; Macaulay, supra note 30.
See Rhee, supra note 46, at 21–30; Willging, supra note 46, at 1141–87.
See Carrie Menkel-Meadow & Bryant Garth, Civil Procedure and Courts, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 679 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds., 2d ed.
2012); see, e.g., Ellen Berrey et al., Situated Justice: Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ Perceptions of Fairness in
Employment Discrimination Cases, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1 (2010); Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelley,
Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117
(2008); Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining Empathy: Discrimination, Experience, and
Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 313 (2012).
52. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957).
53. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). For a non-empirical investigation of Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Iqbal from a critical race theorist, see Roy L. Brooks, Conley
and Twombly: A Critical Race Theory Perspective, 52 HOW. L.J. 31 (2008).
54. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 135, 142 (2007); A. Benjamin Spencer,
Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431 (2008).
55. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; see Stephen Burbank, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect
of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 404–08 (2011); Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure
Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 654–58 (2010); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen
C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L. REV. 821, 831–50 (2010); Suzette M.
Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of
Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 78–106 (2010); Arthur R. Miller, From
Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 20–23
(2010); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on
Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 532-36 (2010); Suja A. Thomas,
The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 15, 34–38 (2010); Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil Rights
Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157, 175–83 (2010).
56. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
57. Iqbal, 556 U.S at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

UCILR V3I2 Assembled v8.7 (Do Not Delete)

2013]

1/22/2014 4:12 PM

A NEW MEANS TO MEASURE CIVIL PROCEDURE

195

Iqbal,58 the U.S. Supreme Court recast Rule 8(a) into a plausibility standard, adding
considerable heft to the pleading requirement of Rule 8(a). In order to survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must now contain sufficient factual matter to state
a claim that is plausible on its face. Problematically, Iqbal requires federal courts,
when deciding whether a complaint is plausible, to draw upon their “judicial
experience and commonsense.”59 Federal courts apply this pleading standard at
the inception of litigation, before evidence has been gathered during discovery.
This highly subjective pleading standard applies to all claims, including claims of
discrimination alleged by members of stereotyped groups.
The Supreme Court unilaterally recast Rule 8(a), and its actions are wrought
with difficulty and problems.60 Critical race empiricists would be especially
concerned that, under Iqbal, federal courts must grapple, at the inception of
litigation, with deciding whether stereotyped-group members have pleaded
plausible claims of discrimination, relying on little more than their intuition. Iqbal
requires judges to draw on their “judicial experience and common sense”61 and,
hence, tasks them with relying on their pre-expectations, priors, and schemas. Yet
judges, like all other people, use heuristics and have systematic biases when
making social judgments.62 For example, implicit bias may operate when federal
courts make highly subjective decisions based on malleable criteria.63 CRT
58. Id. at 679.
59. Id.
60. Scholars have critiqued the Supreme Court’s unilateral change in federal pleading rules on
several fronts, including that it has usurped the Rules Enabling Act process. See Clermont & Yeazell,
supra note 55, at 850 (destabilizing the test for pleading sufficiency, for lodging too much discretion in
judges, and for early termination of cases on the merits without a jury trial); see also A. Benjamin
Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26–36 (2009); Carrington, supra note 55,
at 656–57. Others have argued that heightened pleading would adversely affect civil rights claimants.
See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Plausibly Pleading Employment Discrimination, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613
(2010).
61. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
62. See John C. Anderson et al., Evaluation of Auditor Decisions: Hindsight Bias Effects and the
Expectation Gap, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 711, 725–27 (1993) (reporting a study of judges that tested for
hindsight bias); Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72 WASH.
U.L.Q. 979, 982–89 (1994) (reporting the results of a study of the incidence of egocentric bias among
bankruptcy judges and lawyers); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777,
778 (2001) (“[W]e found that each of the five illusions we tested had a significant impact on judicial
decision making. Judges, it seems, are human. Like the rest of us, their judgment is affected by
cognitive illusions that can produce systematic errors in judgment.”); Stephen Landsman & Richard F.
Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Juries in Civil
Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113 (1994) (reporting results of experiment suggesting that judges and
jurors may be similarly influenced by exposure to potentially biasing information); W. Kip Viscusi,
How Do Judges Think About Risk?, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 26 (1999) (reporting results of a study of
judges’ biases); Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison of Jurors,
Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751, 776, 786 (1999) (studying the factors that contribute to
judges’ assessments of the severity of injuries and judges’ awards for damages).
63. See Chew & Kelley, supra note 51, at 1136, 1155–58; Michael I. Norton et al., Casuistry and
Social Category Bias, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 817, 819–22 (2004); cf. Dan M. Kahan et al.,
“They Saw A Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 853
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scholars should, therefore, harness empirical methods to investigate the effect of
this new pleading regime on claimants of stereotyped groups.
Empirical scholars and the FJC64 have studied whether the new pleading
standard has increased the dismissal rate under Rule 12(b)(6).65 These studies have
used different methods, which have led to mixed results, yet several have
concluded that the dismissal rate has increased for civil rights claims.66 These
studies, however, have not narrowly examined discrimination claims brought by
stereotyped-group members or how judges from different racial groups have
applied these standards.67 I examined these very issues in a prior study and using
an eighteen-month time horizon showed both that the dismissal rate has increased
rather sharply for Black plaintiffs’ claims of race discrimination and that White
and Black judges are applying the new pleading rule differently.68 This Article
makes a further contribution by extending the time horizon to twenty-four
months, comparing how White and Black judges decided claims under both the
old and new pleading regimes, and by conducting regressions to discern whether a
judge’s race predicts how she decides under the new, highly subjective pleading
standard. In short, this Article compares and contrasts two rule regimes—the old
notice-pleading regime, which afforded little room for subjective decision making,
and the new plausibility-pleading regime—to evaluate whether the new pleading
standard allows implicit bias and lay theories to operate against members of
stereotyped groups.
I. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
Within the field of social psychology, the study of prejudice has progressed
in three waves.69 In the first wave, extending from the 1920s through the 1950s,
psychologists studied prejudice chiefly as a psychopathology. They conceived

(2012) (when subjective decision making intersects with cultural cognition, the effect may be even
more pronounced).
64. See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL: REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON CIVIL RULES (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/
$file/motioniqbal.pdf.
65. See id.; Raymond Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment
And Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 262–77 (2011); Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of
Pleading: Do Twombly and lqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 603–67 (2010); Patricia
Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L.
REV. 603, 612–26 (2012).
66. See Brescia, supra note 65, at 262–77; Moore, supra note 65, at 622–24.
67. But see Quintanilla, supra note 5, at 30–42.
68. See id.
69. See Dovidio, supra note 41, at 830–33. In presenting this brief history of the field’s study
of racial prejudice, I draw a distinction between the history of studying the causes and consequences
of racial prejudice and the history of psychologizing racial differences. For an excellent account of the
latter history, see generally AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, DEFINING DIFFERENCE: RACE AND RACISM IN
THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY (Andrew S. Winston ed., 2004).
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racism as a dangerous and abnormal deviation from normal tendencies, rather
than a disruption in normal thinking.70 The second wave conceptualized prejudice
from a different paradigm—prejudice was viewed as widespread and rooted in
normal rather than abnormal thought processes.71 Gordon Allport summarized
the views of this second wave:
How Widespread Is Prejudice? Research suggests that perhaps 80 percent
of the American people harbor ethnic prejudice of some type and in
some appreciable degree. . . .
....
. . . With the aid of aversive categories [many] avoid the painful task of
dealing with individuals as individuals. Prejudice is thus an economical
mode of thought, and is widely embraced for this very reason.72
Focus shifted from prejudice as a psychopathology to how normal
socialization processes support prejudice and aid in its transmission.73 Prejudice,
stereotyping, and discrimination were conceptualized as the result of processes—
social cognition and social categorization—cognitive processes associated with
classifying social information.74 Beginning in the 1990s, the third wave emphasized
the multidimensional aspect of prejudice and harnessed sophisticated new
technologies to study processes that were once theorized but not directly
measured.75 These new technologies measure implicit attitudes—that is, implicit
bias and automatic and unconscious attitudes and beliefs.76 While explicit
measures of prejudice rely on self-reports, implicit measures harness a variety of
techniques, including response latency measures of association (such as the
Implicit Association Test), word fragment completion, linguistic cues, attributions,
explanations, and functional magnetic resonance imaging.77 These new
technologies enable social psychologists to assess individual differences in implicit
and explicit attitudes, helping to differentiate “old-fashioned” racists from aversive
70. See Dovidio, supra note 41, at 830; Harding et al., supra note 40. For a discussion on
prejudice and ethnic relations, see G.M. Gilbert, Stereotype Persistence and Change Among College Students,
46 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 245 (1951); Daniel Katz & Kenneth Braly, Racial Stereotypes of One
Hundred College Students, 28 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 280 (1933).
71. See ALLPORT, supra note 40, at 17–27; Dovidio, supra note 41, at 831; Thomas F.
Pettigrew, Personality and Sociocultural Factors in Intergroup Attitudes: A Cross-National Comparison, 2 J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 29, 29 (1958).
72. See Gordon W. Allport, Prejudice and the Individual, in JOHN PRESTON DAVIS, THE
AMERICAN NEGRO REFERENCE BOOK 706, 707, 710 (1966).
73. See Dovidio, supra note 41, at 831; Pettigrew, supra note 71, at 29.
74. See Dovidio, supra note 41, at 831; Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination,
in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 357, 357 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998)
(“On the cusp of the twenty-first century, stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination have not
abated.”).
75. See Dovidio, supra note 41, at 832.
76. See Fiske, supra note 74, at 364–67; John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Intergroup Bias,
in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1084 (Susan T. Fiske et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010).
77. See Dovidio, supra note 41, at 838; Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 76, at 1086.
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racists.78 In the current wave, these social scientists actively investigate how
interpersonal and intergroup contexts and situations affect implicit bias.79 A chief
insight is that social contexts and situations powerfully shape racial prejudice and
implicit bias.80
Aversive racism rests on a contradiction between explicit and implicit
attitudes.81 This form of modern prejudice characterizes the racial attitudes of
many well-intentioned people who possess strong egalitarian values and believe
themselves to be nonprejudiced, but who nonetheless hold negative racial feelings
and stereotypes.82 That is, implicit bias coexists with egalitarian beliefs and the
denial of personal prejudice. John Dovidio and colleagues refer to this modern
form of prejudice as “aversive” for two reasons: First, rather than open
antagonism, majority-group members feel anxiety toward minority-group
members, which leads them to avoid interracial interactions.83 Second, because
aversive racists adhere to egalitarian principles, they find the thought that they are
prejudiced disquieting and disturbing.84
Social psychologists have closely studied aversive racism over the past
decade and achieved an important insight: social contexts and social situations
powerfully affect whether and how implicit bias is expressed against minoritygroup members. In short, situations and contexts powerfully shape and influence
implicit bias.85 Aversive racists aspire to be nonprejudiced; they do not
discriminate against minority-group members in situations with strong egalitarian
norms, where discrimination would be obvious to others and themselves.86 In
these situations, aversive racists avoid feelings, beliefs, and behaviors that would
be associated with bias. When the correct choice is clear and egalitarian norms
prevail, aversive racists do not discriminate against minority-group members.87 Yet
78. See Dovidio, supra note 41, at 835.
79. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 76, at 1112.
80. See id.; Alice H. Eagly & Amanda B. Diekman, What Is the Problem? Prejudice as an Attitude-inContext, in ON THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE FIFTY YEARS AFTER ALLPORT 19 (John F. Dovidio ed.,
2005).
81. See SAMUEL L. GAERTNER & JOHN F. DOVIDIO, REDUCING INTERGROUP BIAS: THE
COMMON INGROUP IDENTITY MODEL 13–14 (2000).
82. See id.; John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism and Selection Decisions: 1989
and 1999, 11 PSYCHOL. SCI. 315, 315 (2000).
83. See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, When Good People Do Bad Things: The Nature of
Contemporary Racism, in COVERT RACISM 111, 113 (Rodney Coates ed., 2012); Jennifer A. Richeson &
J. Nicole Shelton, When Prejudice Does Not Pay: Effects of Interracial Contact on Executive Function, 14
PSYCHOL. SCI. 287, 287 (2003).
84. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 83, at 111–20.
85. See, e.g., Richeson & Shelton, supra note 83; Laura G. Babbit & Samuel R. Sommers,
Framing Matters: Contextual Influences on Interracial Interaction Outcomes, 37 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1233 (2011).
86. See Christopher L. Aberson & Tara E. Ettlin, The Aversive Racism Paradigm and Responses
Favoring African Americans: Meta-Analytic Evidence of Two Types of Favoritism, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 25, 42–43
(2004).
87. See id.
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aversive racists express bias subtly and in ways that can be rationalized under
conditions of situational ambiguity: when norms are unclear, when situations are
ambiguous, when the correct choice is unclear, where bias against minority-group
members can be rationalized on some factor other than race.88 In these situations,
aversive racists may harm minority-group members in ways that allow them to
maintain a nonprejudiced self-concept.89
A robust body of social-psychological research has investigated the
phenomenon of implicit bias. Many studies examine the phenomenon in scenarios
involving ambiguous hiring criteria and in situations where majority-group
members exhibit in-group preference for other majority-group members while
withholding assistance to minority-group members.90 Moreover, several studies
illustrate the persistence of modern prejudice on jury decision making. For
example, in a seminal 1995 study, Johnson, Whitestone, Jackson, and Gatto
explored the effect of implicit bias on jury decision making and showed that
inadmissible evidence suggesting guilt differentially affects jury decisions
depending on whether the defendant is White or Black.91 In this study, researchers
examined White mock jurors’ judgments on a White or Black defendant’s guilt
where inadmissible evidence damaged the defendant’s case.92 While White and
Black defendants were treated similarly when all the evidence presented was
admissible, consistent with the aversive racism framework, Black defendants fared
far worse when the evidence was inadmissible.93 The results suggest that implicit
bias operated against Black defendants because, in self-reports, participants stated
that they believed that the inadmissible evidence did not affect their decisions.94
Recent studies show a similar pattern of results.95
Turning from aversive racism to lay theories of racism, a lay theory is an
“organized knowledge structure that directs behavior, judgments, and
evaluations.”96 A lay theory of racism signifies the prior beliefs, presuppositions,
88. See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism, 36 ADVANCES
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 52 (2004).
89. See James D. Johnson et al., Justice Is Still Not Colorblind: Differential Racial Effects of Exposure
to Inadmissible Evidence, 21 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 893, 893–98 (1995).
90. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 88, at 16; see also Norton et al., supra note 63, at 820–
22.
91. See Johnson et al., supra note 89.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. The 2005 study replicated the result using inadmissible DNA evidence. Participants
tended to draw on the inadmissible evidence when judging Black defendants, but not White
defendants. See Gordon Hodson et al., Aversive Racism in Britain: Legal Decisions and the Use of Inadmissible
Evidence, 35 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 437 (2005).
96. Jessica A. Cameron et al., Children’s Lay Theories About Ingroups and Outgroups:
Reconceptualizing Research on Prejudice, 5 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 118, 118 (2001); see also Chi-yue
Chiu et al., Implicit Theories and Conceptions of Morality, 73 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 923, 923–24 (1997);
Carol S. Dweck et al., Implicit Theories: Individual Differences in the Likelihood and Meaning of Dispositional
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and schemas that one holds about the kinds of behaviors that rise to the level of
racism and prejudice.97 These lay theories satisfy various psychological needs,
including helping people make sense of complicated information, creating a social
reality that is informative but nonthreatening, and allowing majority-group
members to maintain a safe distance from appearing biased.98 Science reveals that
prejudice has mutated from overt to more subtle and difficult-to-detect forms.99
Yet there is a growing gap between this science and the folk theory that, in
American society, racism is no longer a problem. Many adhere to the lay theory
that racists are overt bigots, which affects whether they perceive discrimination
after the fact and whether, in turn, they form the attribution that a stigmatizedgroup member was subjected to racism.100 Lay theories of racism, therefore, shape
how legal decision makers interpret allegations of discrimination.101
Social psychologists have identified two lay theories of racism.102 Many
majority-group members subscribe to the dominant lay theory. This lay theory
conceptualizes racist behavior in overt, blatant terms.103 Those who subscribe to
this lay theory tend to believe that discrimination against stigmatized-group
members is no longer a significant problem. (Indeed, many tend to view
discrimination against majority-group members as a more pervasive problem.)104
Under this folk theory, quintessential racism includes discouraging White children
from playing with Black children, joining a group that espouses racial bigotry, or
rejecting Black job applicants because of their race.105 Those who hold this lay
theory do not perceive modern prejudice—or in-group favoritism toward
majority-group members—as racism against stigmatized-group members. Indeed,
many who subscribe to this lay theory exhibit “Bayesian racism,” the intuition that
it is rational to form impressions about people based on stereotypes about their
racial group.106

Inference, 19 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 644, 644–45 (1993); Daniel C. Molden & Carol S.
Dweck, Finding “Meaning” in Psychology: A Lay Theories Approach to Self-Regulation, Social Perception, and
Social Development, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 192, 193–94 (2006); Mary C. Murphy & Carol S. Dweck, A
Culture of Genius: How an Organization’s Lay Theory Shapes People’s Cognition, Affect, and Behavior, 36
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 283, 284 (2009); Aneeta Rattan & Carol S. Dweck, Who
Confronts Prejudice? The Role of Implicit Theories in the Motivation to Confront Prejudice, 21 PSYCHOL. SCI. 952,
952–53 (2010).
97. See Sommers & Norton, supra note 44, at 118.
98. See id.
99. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 76, at 1085–86.
100. See Quintanilla, supra note 5, at 23.
101. See id.
102. See Sommers & Norton, supra note 44, at 119, 128.
103. See id. at 131.
104. See Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism as a Zero-Sum Game that
They Are Now Losing, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 215, 216 (2011).
105. See Sommers & Norton, supra note 44, at 128.
106. See Eric Luis Uhlmann et al., The Motives Underlying Stereotype-Based Discrimination Against
Members of Stigmatized Groups, 23 SOC. JUST. RES. 1 (2010).
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A less prevalent lay theory conceptualizes racism in both overt and subtle
forms.107 Many stigmatized-group members, and some majority-group members,
subscribe to this lay theory. Under this lay theory, people are vigilant to subtle
cues of prejudice and racism.108 Unlike the dominant folk theory of racism, this lay
theory views a larger swath of behavior as diagnostic of racism, including in-group
favoritism toward majority-group members that harms minority-group
members.109 Under this lay theory, ambivalence, anxiety, and passive harm toward
stigmatized-group members may be diagnostic of racism.110 Those who subscribe
to this lay theory believe that, in American society, racism against stigmatizedgroup members continues to be a contemporary problem.111
From this social-psychological research, I draw two hypotheses on how the
shift from Conley’s notice pleading to Iqbal’s plausibility pleading may affect legal
decision making. First, unlike notice pleading, plausibility pleading is a highly
subjective and ambiguous standard, which may allow implicit bias to operate
against minority-group members. As a result, judges would likely increasingly
dismiss Black plaintiffs’ claims of race discrimination, particularly in ambiguous
cases. Although I evaluated this hypothesis in my prior piece “Beyond Common
Sense,”112 in this Article, I have expanded the time horizon from eighteen months
to twenty-four months, making for a more robust test of this hypothesis. Second,
White and Black judges, on balance, likely hold different lay theories of racism.
Because the notice pleading rule did not allow judges to rely on lay theories, White
and Black judges would tend to reach similar judgments under Conley; because
Iqbal requires judges to draw on their lay theories, White and Black judges will
reach dissimilar judgments under Iqbal. As a result, there will be a larger gap
between how White and Black judges decide motions to dismiss under plausibility
pleading than under notice pleading. In “Beyond Common Sense,” I compared
and contrasted how White and Black judges applied Iqbal.113 In this Article, I now
compare and contrast how White and Black judges decided cases both under
Conley and Iqbal, thereby providing an empirical baseline to evaluate whether Iqbal
has led to differences in how White and Black judges decide motions to dismiss.
II. AN UPDATED ANALYSIS OF IQBAL’S EFFECT
ON RACE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
The Article now turns to two empirical legal studies that examine how
federal district courts have adjudicated Black plaintiffs’ claims of race-based

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See Sommers & Norton, supra note 44, at 128.
See Quintanilla, supra note 5, at 24.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Quintanilla, supra note 5, at 32–37.
Id. at 38–40.
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employment discrimination at the pleading stage. I first describe the methods
employed and my findings, and then I summarize the results.
A. Method
I performed two studies examining how federal district courts adjudicated
motions to dismiss Black plaintiffs’ claims of race-based employment
discrimination under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).114 Both studies
focused on decision making by federal district court judges.115 Like other studies
examining the effect of Iqbal,116 this investigation examined motions to dismiss
filed under Rule 12(b)(6), the mechanism by which defendants challenge the legal
sufficiency of claims.117 Unlike my prior empirical legal study, which employed an
eighteen-month time horizon118 before Twombly119 and after Iqbal, this updated
analysis drew a twenty-four month time horizon.
Using broad Westlaw120 searches, I retrieved all cases deciding motions to
dismiss in employment discrimination cases filed by Black plaintiffs under Title
VII or § 1981.121 Many of the initially retrieved cases fell beyond the scope of the

114. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
115. Both studies counted dispositive decisions by federal district courts only, not those of
magistrate judges. All magistrate decisions were excluded from the computations, whether or not
those decisions were made by consent of the parties. The studies, however, did count decisions in
which a federal district court decided whether to dismiss a Black plaintiff’s claim of race
discrimination after receiving a report and recommendation from a magistrate judge.
116. See CECIL ET AL., supra note 64; Hatamyar, supra note 65; Moore, supra note 65, at 603–
67; Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado about Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811 (2007). A change in how federal district
courts resolve motions to dismiss is only one potential effect of the decision. Other scholars have
begun addressing how the decision affects party and attorney behavior. See Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking
the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270,
2301–10 (2012).
117. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 669 (“Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state sufficient allegations . . . .”).
118. See Quintanilla, supra note 5, at 31, 34–35.
119. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
120. All cases were obtained from the Westlaw federal district court database (DCT). Many
decisions were not published in the West Reporters and were available only electronically. Decisions
exclusively on PACER or CM-ECF that were unavailable on Westlaw were not examined. The study,
therefore, does not establish the absolute rate of dismissals in all decisions or measure the absolute
number of Rule 12(b)(6) motions decided before and after Iqbal. Even so, others have shown that
decisions available on Westlaw tend to reflect judicial decision making in unpublished docket orders
as well. Moore, supra note 65, at 644. Westlaw is a pivotal resource in the transmission of legal
knowledge, and hence, if a disparate effect is demonstrated in this widely used legal database, the
effect will have epistemological and practical significance on how jurists and advocates handle cases.
121. To increase the power of the study, the inquiry included cases deciding § 1981 claims.
See ARTHUR ARON ET AL., STATISTICS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 210, 225–27
(4th ed. 2008) (defining statistical power). Some plaintiffs choose to file claims of discrimination
under § 1981 rather than Title VII. Federal district courts use the same test for intentional
discrimination under Title VII and § 1981. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Syracuse, 673 F.3d 141, 150 (2d
Cir. 2012); Burnell v. Gates Rubber Co., 647 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 2011); Egonmwan v. Cook Cnty.
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study. For example, the present studies examined claims of race-based
discrimination and harassment filed by Black plaintiffs122 and, therefore, did not
analyze how retaliation claims or claims based on other legally protected
characteristics (such as gender, national origin, or religion)123 fared under the new
pleading standard.
Whereas most other reported studies have broadly evaluated whether Iqbal
has increased the dismissal rate overall across all federal cases, or all federal civil
rights cases, my studies narrowly focus on a particular category of claims.124 In
“Beyond Common Sense,” I discussed the importance of focusing on “situation
types” or “particularized situations”125 when evaluating Iqbal’s effect on Rule
12(b)(6) dismissals. In a similar vein, this updated analysis narrowly examines and
evaluates the hypothesis that plausibility pleading has affected Black plaintiffs’
claims of race discrimination and racial harassment in ambiguous cases. Research
demonstrates that legal decision makers exhibit aversive racism in ambiguous
situations when deciding based upon malleable criteria, but not in unequivocal
situations where criteria are clear and fixed.126
My studies operationalize “ambiguous” cases as meaning cases in which
defendants move to dismiss Black127 plaintiffs’ claims of race discrimination on
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 602 F.3d 845, 850 n.7 (7th Cir. 2010). Some plaintiffs advanced claims under both
Title VII and § 1981; because courts evaluate the question of intentional discrimination similarly
under both provisions, the study counted only the disposition of the Title VII claim to avoid double
counting. See, e.g., Hanks v. Shinseki, No. 3:08-CV_1594-G, 2009 WL 2002917, at *1 (N.D. Tex.
July 9, 2009) (granting dismissal of Title VII and § 1981 claims under McDonnell Douglas framework).
For 1981 cases, the analysis excluded those cases where defendants sought to dismiss on grounds of
governmental immunity: for example, in cases where the sole issue is whether a sufficient custom or
policy had been alleged for municipality to be liable under § 1981.
122. The study also included claims filed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
on behalf of Black claimants. See, e.g., Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. Scrub, Inc., No. 09 C
4228, 2009 WL 3458530, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2009).
123. The analysis included Black plaintiffs’ claims of race or color discrimination, but not
claims of national origin discrimination.
124. A literature review revealed that only one other study has tailored the analysis to evaluate
how Iqbal has affected Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals in cases in which the defendant argues that a plaintiff
has failed to sufficiently plead factual allegations to support her claim. See Brescia, supra note 65, at
239. To the extent that other empirical legal analyses have not done so, it appears likely that those
studies have underreported Iqbal’s effect on the adjudication of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals. See JOE S.
CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF RULE 12(B)(6) MOTIONS
GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/library/fjc_catalog.nsf
(“These findings do not rule out the possibility that the pleading standards established in Twombly and
Iqbal may have a greater effect in narrower categories of cases in which respondents must obtain the
facts from movants in order to state a claim. Unfortunately, we were not able to restrict this study to
motions that involve issues of the sufficiency of the factual pleadings, since we do not know how to
identify comparable motions during the period before Twombly, when the sufficiency of factual
pleading was not thought to be the basis for challenging a pleading.”).
125. See Quintanilla, supra note 5, at 32; see also Leiter, supra note 33, at 28–30; Karl N.
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 457–60 (1930).
126. See supra Part I; Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 82, at 317–18.
127. The analysis included only those cases in which judicial decisions indicated that the
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grounds that plaintiffs had not sufficiently pleaded claims of race
discrimination.128 The studies, hence, exclude claims dismissed on technical
grounds for failing to comply with the prerequisites of a viable Title VII action.
There are two prerequisites for a viable Title VII action: “filing timely charges of
employment discrimination with the [EEOC] and . . . receiving and acting upon
the Commission’s statutory notice of the right to sue.”129 Exhaustion of the
EEOC administrative procedures is mandatory.130 I applied these two
prerequisites to draw a distinction between unambiguous and ambiguous claims.
Unambiguously weak claims were those where plaintiffs failed to file a timely
charge of discrimination with the EEOC or failed to sue within ninety days after
receiving a right-to-sue letter.131 Unambiguously weak claims also included those
where plaintiffs failed to exhaust their remedies, such as where plaintiffs’ claims of
race discrimination fell beyond the scope of their charges filed with the EEOC;132
and where plaintiffs sought to hold coworkers liable, rather than an employer,
which falls outside the scope of Title VII.133 Because these cases turn on clear
criteria and fixed rules, these cases are neither ambiguous nor entail deficiencies in
the factual particularity of pleadings.

plaintiff was Black or African American. If the decision did not reveal the race or color of the
plaintiff, then the case was not counted for purposes of analysis.
128. Because ambiguousness is not a construct that can be directly observed, an operational
definition is necessary to translate between social psychological findings and judicial decision making.
See CHAVA FRANKFORD-NACHMIAS & DAVID NACHMIAS, RESEARCH METHODS IN THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 28 (6th ed. 2000).
129. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973); see also BARBARA T.
LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, 2 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1749 (C. Geoffrey
Weirich ed., 4th ed. 2007).
130. First, a plaintiff must file an EEOC charge of discrimination within 300 days of the
alleged discriminatory practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2006); 2 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra
note 129, at 1750–51. A 180-day timeline applies in non-deferral states. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)
Second, plaintiffs must file suit within ninety days after receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Federal courts allow for equitable tolling of these limitation periods in
narrow instances. See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
131. The study excluded claims dismissed as untimely. If the defendant moved to dismiss a
claim for failure to exhaust EEOC remedies or for untimeliness, and the court granted that motion,
then the decision was excluded from consideration. To apply this rule consistently, the study also
excluded cases that rejected the defendant’s motion to dismiss based solely on the mistaken belief that
the plaintiff’s Title VII claim was untimely. Where federal courts rejected an untimeliness argument
but also considered a Rule 8(a) basis for dismissal, the study counted the Rule 8(a) decision on the
claim.
132. The same exclusionary rule was applied here as well. If the defendant moved to dismiss a
claim for failure to exhaust remedies with the EEOC, and the court granted that motion, then the
study excluded that decision from consideration. Where courts rejected defendant’s exhaustion
argument but also considered an argument under Rule 8(a), the study counted the Rule 8(a) decision
on the claim.
133. Individual employees are not liable under Title VII. The study also excluded cases in
which the plaintiff sued the wrong business or governmental entity, drawing on the same exclusionary
rule described above.
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I deemed the remaining cases “ambiguous” because they required courts to
evaluate whether Black plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded claims of race
discrimination or racial harassment. These cases turned largely on whether
plaintiffs had pleaded claims of discrimination with sufficient factual specificity
under Rule 8(a)(2).134 By operationalizing ambiguousness in this way, the study
examined the narrow category of cases most suitable to study whether implicit
bias and lay theories of discrimination affect legal decision making. Next, I
analyzed each case135 and coded the dependent variable according to the three
possible outcomes for decisions under Rule 12(b)(6): granted, denied, or mixed.136
The research examined the frequency of decisions in each of these three categories
twenty-four months before Twombly and twenty-four months after Iqbal.137
B. Results
This Article first presents changes in the dismissal rates for Black plaintiffs’
claims of race discrimination and next compares and contrasts how White and
Black judges adjudicated these claims under notice pleading versus plausibility
pleading.
Study 1: Has Iqbal Increased the Dismissal Rate for Black Plaintiffs’ Claims
of Race Discrimination in the Workplace?138
Study 1 tests the hypothesis that federal district courts would grant a larger
percentage of motions to dismiss under Iqbal’s plausibility-pleading standard than
under Conley’s notice-pleading rule when deciding Black plaintiffs’ claims of race
discrimination in the workplace. The results are presented in Table 1 and Figure 1.

134. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”).
135. The SPSS database is available upon request. Independent variables included the date
(pre-Twombly versus post-Iqbal ), the race of the judge, and the nominating party of the judge. For the
dependent variable, the study recorded only rulings on claims of race-based discrimination or
harassment challenged by a 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion.
136. The study coded decisions granted, denied, or mixed. Rulings were granted when a
motion to dismiss was granted for all race-based claims that the defendant challenged as insufficient
under Rule 8. The study coded decisions denied when a motion to dismiss was denied for all racebased claims in dispute. The study coded decisions granted in part and denied in part (or mixed) when
a motion was denied at least in part for race-based claims: the court accepted part, but rejected part,
of the defendant’s argument under Rule 8, and in turn allowed at least one race-based claim to survive
dismissal.
137. Because Twombly was decided on May 21, 2007, the twenty-four-month range for preTwombly decisions was from May 20, 2005 to May 20, 2007. Iqbal was decided on May 18, 2009. To
allow federal courts sufficient time to disseminate and synthesize the case, I began the range on
June 1, 2009; therefore, the twenty-four-month range for post-Iqbal decisions was from June 1, 2009
to June 1, 2011.
138. For a prior version of this study employing a time horizon of eighteen months rather
than twenty-four months, see Quintanilla, supra note 5, at 35–37.
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Table 1: Observed Frequency, Expected Frequency (in Parentheses), and
Percentage of Rulings in Study for Black Plaintiffs’ Claims of Race Discrimination
in the Workplace (Twenty-Four-Month Time Horizon)
Grant
Deny
Mixed
Total
23 (42.5)
73 (50.4)
3 (6.2)
99
Conley
23.2%
73.7%
3.0%
101 (81.5)
74 (96.6)
15 (11.8)
190
Iqbal
53.2%
38.9%
7.9%
124
147
18
289
Total
42.9%
50.9%
6.2%
Pearson  2 (2, N = 289) = 31.55, p < .00, Cramer’s V = .330
Figure 1: Percentage of Rulings in Study for Black Plaintiffs’ Claims
(Twenty-Four-Month Time Horizon)
Notice-Pleading
80%

73.7%

60%

Plausibility-Pleading

53.2%
38.9%

40%
23.2%
20%

3.0%

7.9%

0%
Grant

Deny

Mixed

Study 1 shows that federal district courts have increased the dismissal rate
for Black plaintiffs’ claims of race-based employment discrimination in ambiguous
cases. Within the twenty-four-month time horizon, it was 2.29 times more likely
that these claims would be dismissed when challenged as insufficient under Rule
8(a). The Supreme Court’s shift in pleading standards from notice pleading to
plausibility pleading has resulted in an increased dismissal rate. Courts are
increasingly concluding that Black plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead claims
of discrimination. This increase was statistically significant.139 Moreover, Study 1
139. Using SPSS, a chi-squared test was performed. A two-way contingency table analysis was
used to evaluate the change in dismissal rates. The two variables were (1) time period when the
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reveals that, after Iqbal, defendants were much more likely to seek to dismiss Black
plaintiffs’ claims of race discrimination. Indeed, in the twenty-four-month time
horizon under Conley, defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that Black plaintiffs’
claims of race-based employment discrimination were insufficiently plead, ninetynine times; in the twenty-four-month time horizon under Iqbal, defendants moved
for dismissal on such grounds 190 times, virtually a two-fold increase.140
Study 2: Did White and Black Judges Decide Motions to Dismiss Differently Under Conley,
and Do They Decide Motions to Dismiss Differently Under Iqbal?141
Study 2 evaluates the hypothesis that White and Black judges would, on
balance, decide motions to dismiss differently under Iqbal’s highly subjective
plausibility standard, but not under Conley’s notice-pleading rule. Convergence of
White and Black judges’ decisions under notice pleading and divergence of their
decisions under plausibility pleading would be consistent with the socialpsychological research discussed in Part I.
Table 2A: Observed Frequency, Expected Frequency (in Parentheses), and
Percentage of Rulings in Study for White Versus Black Judges Under Conley
Grant
Deny
Mixed
Total
17 (18)
59 (58.4)
3 (2.6)
79
White Judges
21.5%
74.7%
3.8%
4 (3)
9 (9.6)
0 (.4)
13
Black Judges
30.8%
69.2%
0.0%
21
68
3
92
Total
22.8%
73.9%
3.3%
Pearson  2 (2, N = 92) = .957, p = not significant, Cramer’s V = .102

motion to dismiss was decided with two levels (pre-Twombly and post-Iqbal ), and (2) decision with
three levels (grant, deny, mixed). Time period and decision were found to be significantly related,
Pearson  2 (2, N = 289) = 31.545, p < .00, Cramer’s V = .330.
140. Because my sample draws on cases available on Westlaw, I note that these figures are
samples that reflect the changing legal landscape and do not reflect the total population of all motions
activity by the federal courts. Even so, this pattern—the roughly twofold increase in filing of motions
to dismiss—is consistent with other empirical legal studies, including the FJC’s report. Jonah Gelbach
and Lonny Hoffman have argued that focusing solely on dismissal rates understates the problem in
the degree that it neglects the rising tide of motions to dismiss filed after Iqbal. See Gelbach, supra note
116, at 2324; Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the FJC’s Study of Motions
to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 7, 15–16. The pattern reflected by my analysis supports their
argument.
141. For a prior study comparing White and Black judges’ decisions under Iqbal only, see
Quintanilla, supra note 5, at 38–40.
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Figure 2A: Percentage of Rulings in Study for
White Versus Black Judges Under Conley

74.7%

80%

White Judges
69.2%

Black Judges

60%
40%

30.8%
21.5%

20%
3.8%
0%
Grant

Deny

0.0%

Mixed

Table 2B: Observed Frequency, Expected Frequency (in Parentheses), and
Percentage of Rulings in Study for White Versus Black Judges Under Iqbal
Grant
Deny
Mixed
Total
93 (86.8)
59 (63.1)
11 (13.1)
163
White Judges
57.1%
36.2%
6.7%
6 (12.2)
13 (8.9)
4 (1.9)
23
Black Judges
26.1%
56.5%
17.4%
99
72
15
186
Total
53.2%
38.7%
8.1%
Pearson  2 (2, N = 186) = 8.614, p = .01, Cramer’s V = .215
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Figure 2B: Percentage of Rulings in Study for
White Versus Black Judges Under Iqbal
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Study 2 reveals modest differences in how White and Black judges decided
motions to dismiss Black plaintiffs’ claims of race discrimination under Conley,
which was not statistically significant. Yet White judges are dismissing Black
plaintiffs’ claims of employment discrimination under Iqbal at a higher rate
(57.1%) than Black judges (26.1%), a difference that is statistically significant. It
was 2.18 times more likely that a White judge would grant dismissal of these
claims than a Black judge.142
I performed a follow-up analysis to discern whether the difference in how
White and Black judges are applying Iqbal can be better explained by political
orientation. While there are more White Republican than Black Republican
judges,143 a logistic regression pitting the judge’s race (White versus Black) against

142. In a prior study that I performed in 2011, the results were marginally significant due to
limited data. However, the present study, which entails a larger time horizon and thus a larger sample
of cases, revealed that the differences were statistically significant. A two-way contingency table
analysis was conducted to evaluate whether the proportions were similar or dissimilar for dismissal.
Judges’ race and decisions were found not to be statistically significant under Conley, Pearson  2 (2,
N = 92) = .957, p = .62, Cramer’s V = .102 but statistically significant under Iqbal, Pearson  2 (2, N
= 186) = 8.614, p = .01, Cramer’s V = .215.
143. This study drew upon the political party of the appointing President as a proxy for the
political orientation of each federal district judge. For example, as of August 2012, there were 488
White Republican federal district court judges, 350 White Democrat federal district court judges, 29
Black Republican federal district court judges, and 70 Black Democrat federal district court judges.
FJC’s website contains a search tool to gather these overall figures. See Research Categories, FED.
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the judge’s political orientation (Democrat versus Republican) revealed that the
judge’s race better explained the likelihood that a judge would fully grant a motion
to dismiss (odds ratio = 3.197, Wald  2 (1, N = 186) = 4.973, p = .03) and that
political orientation (odds ratio = 1.427, Wald  2 (1, N = 186) = 1.24, p = .27)
was not significant.144 White judges were more than twice as likely to dismiss
Black plaintiffs’ claims of race discrimination than Black judges—even after taking
into account likely political affiliation.
This disparity is largely attributable to whether courts found that Black
plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded prima facie cases of discrimination and plausible
claims of discrimination.145
C. Discussion
Study 1 demonstrates that the shift from notice pleading to plausibility
pleading has increased the dismissal rate for Black plaintiffs’ claims of race
discrimination. Indeed, the dismissal rate rose from 23.2% under Conley to 53.2%
under Iqbal. It is 2.29 times more likely that a judge will dismiss Black plaintiffs’
claims of race discrimination under the new standard. This stark rise in the
dismissal rate is greater than increases in other categories of federal actions. For
example, similar studies have shown that the base rate of dismissals for all federal

JUDICIAL CTR., www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/research_categories.html (last visited Oct. 9,
2012).
144. Using SPSS, I performed several sequential logistic regressions. In the first regression, I
performed a simultaneous two-level logistic regression (“grant” versus the combination of “deny” and
“grant and deny”) with the judge’s race and the appointing party of the President as predictors. This
simultaneous regression model included both predictor variables, pitting the judge’s race against
political ideology. This analysis revealed a statistically significant effect of the judge’s race on the grant
rate for claims of race discrimination after Iqbal, odds ratio = 3.197, Wald  2 (1, N = 186) = 4.973,
p = .03. In contrast, the beta for political orientation was not significant. Next I performed a
sequential logistic regression, which entered the judge’s race into the model first, and then asked
whether the judge’s political orientation offered significant predictive power above and beyond the
judge’s race. This was a two-level sequential logistic regression (again, “grant” versus the combination
of “deny” and “grant and deny”) with the judge’s race entered in the first step and the appointing
party of the President entered in the second step. In the first step, the analysis revealed a statistically
significant effect of the judge’s race on the grant rate for claims of race discrimination after Iqbal, odds
ratio = 3.764, Wald  2 (1, N = 186) = 7.014, p = .01. The second step, which added the judge’s
political orientation to the model, was not significant, meaning that while the model itself was
significant, the judge’s political orientation did not add predictive power to the model. In the second
step, the beta for political orientation was not significant. For an excellent discussion of logistic
regression, see BARBARA G. TABACHNICK & LINDA S. FIDELL, USING MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS
437–504 (5th ed. 2007). After Iqbal, approximately 11% of the federal district court judges within the
sample decided more than one motion to dismiss Black plaintiffs’ claims of race discrimination;
therefore, to ensure that this repeatedness did not affect the results, I used a repeated measure to
account for the fact that some judges were captured more than once. A general estimate equation
analysis revealed that this repeatedness did not change the significance of the results or the direction
of any of the beta coefficients.
145. See Quintanilla, supra note 5, at 36.
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actions rose from 46% under the old standard to 56% under the new standard,146
meaning that the base rate of dismissals for all federal actions increased by 1.21
times, far less than the increased rate for Black plaintiffs’ claims of race
discrimination.
Study 2 revealed that White and Black judges decided Black plaintiffs’ claims
comparably under notice pleading, but that White judges granted dismissal at a
higher rate than Black judges under plausibility pleading. Under plausibility
pleading, White judges dismissed Black plaintiffs’ claims of race discrimination at a
much higher rate than Black judges, 57.1% versus 26.1%—in other words, it was
2.18 times more likely that a White judge would grant dismissal than a Black judge.
A follow-up analysis revealed that the divergence between White and Black judges
was not primarily due to political orientation. While there are more White
Republican judges than Black Republican judges, White judges were over twice as
likely to dismiss these cases than Black judges, even after taking into account
political orientation. A logistic regression performed pitting race (White versus
Black) against political orientation (Democrat versus Republican) revealed that the
judge’s race was a better predictor than political orientation of whether or not
judges will dismiss these claims.
Finally, while this study examined how judges responded to changes in the
pleading standard, judicial decision making is but one aspect of how Iqbal has
likely affected civil rights litigation.147 The FJC’s study,148 for example, illustrates
that defendants are far more likely to file motions to dismiss under the new
pleading rule, meaning that—even holding the dismissal rate constant—the overall
percentage of cases dismissed has likely increased.149 In this regard, Study 1
similarly reveals an overall increase in the likelihood that defendants will file a
motion to dismiss these claims. While my investigation did not explore how
claimants, defendants, and attorneys have responded to changes in the pleading
regime, it may be that plaintiffs’ attorneys are less likely to represent plaintiffs
whose claims are complex and at the margin, which would tend to either decrease
the percentage of counseled cases and/or decrease the absolute number of
litigated cases overall. In a prior study, moreover, I found that, when Black
plaintiffs choose to litigate claims without counsel, their pro se status shaped
judicial impressions at the pleading stage, increasing the likelihood that their
claims will be dismissed.150
III. CRITICAL RACE EMPIRICISM
The Article now turns to how these empirical findings, and critical race
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See Hatamyar, supra note 65, at 597–615.
See Gelbach, supra note 116, at 2306–07.
See CECIL ET AL., supra note 64.
See id. at 8–12; Gelbach, supra note 116, at 2324–27; Hoffman, supra note 140, at 15–16.
See Quintanilla, supra note 5, at 52–54.
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empiricism more generally, allow one to explore CRT. These empirical findings,
for example, illuminate CRT’s claims that “blindness” to race cannot ensure
neutral and objective application of legal rules and that the everyday application of
legal rules and structures, rather than intentional behavior by “bad apples,”
produces disparate effects.
A significant problem with the new pleading regime, as Study 2 illustrates, is
that the new standard requires federal judges to draw on their “experience and
common sense”151 when gauging the plausibility of claims of race discrimination.
As a result, majority-group members and minority-group members, on balance,
will perceive and handle these claims differently. Applying Iqbal, White and Black
judges diverge on the plausibility of discrimination. This suggests that jurists are
drawing on their lay theories of discrimination, their prior expectations, and their
schemas. Research discussed in Part I reveals that majority-group members and
stigmatized-group members often subscribe to different lay theories.152 Majoritygroup members tend to conceptualize racism as no longer a modern problem and
conceive of racism in primarily overt terms.153 Meanwhile, many minority-group
members, and some majority-group members, subscribe to the belief that racism
continues to be a modern problem.154 They conceive racism in both overt and
subtle terms.155 Given the socio-political-demographic composition of the federal
judiciary, the subjective nature of the new standard raises the potential that
modern forms of prejudice will be underaddressed. In this way, the new pleading
standard tends to legitimize the perspective that prejudice is blatant while
excluding the perspective of stigmatized-group members who are harmed by more
subtle and difficult-to-detect forms of prejudice.
The new pleading standard, as a practical matter, limits the reach of federal
protections against discrimination. While federal antidiscrimination laws afford
stigmatized-group members protection against blatant racism, the new standard
curbs federal antidiscrimination laws from addressing modern prejudice, a form of
prejudice that is chronic, persistent, and pervasive in American society.156 Racial
disparities are widespread in the United States: racial disparities persist in
unemployment rates, income levels, incarceration rates, and health care.157 One
151. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
152. See Sommers & Norton, supra note 44, at 128–30.
153. See id.
154. See id. As Alan Freeman wrote long ago, the concept of racial discrimination may be
approached from different perspectives. These different perspectives shape the degree to which
people perceive the frequency and occurrence of discrimination in society. See Alan D. Freeman,
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine,
62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052–57 (1977).
155. See Sommers & Norton, supra note 44, at 128–30.
156. See Jason A. Nier & Samuel L. Gaertner, The Challenge of Detecting Contemporary Forms of
Discrimination, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 207 (2012); Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit
Attitudes and Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 36, 88 (2007).
157. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND
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source of these disparities is modern prejudice. While overtly racist attitudes and
discrimination have waned, prejudice and discrimination have mutated into a more
subtle form.158 Under the new standard, federal antidiscrimination laws now
address subtle forms of discrimination only unpredictably and by happenstance—
plausibility pleading, thereby, clouds the remedy to halt racial discrimination.
Without a reliable, realistic remedy against modern prejudice, stereotyped-group
members have no “real right” to be free from modern prejudice.159 And with no
real right to be free from modern prejudice, as Hohfield observed long ago,
majority-group members would have the privilege to discriminate against
stigmatized-group members in subtle ways that are difficult to detect and prove.
In short, despite incremental statutory prohibitions against race prejudice,
plausibility pleading renders a wide swath of modern prejudice against minoritygroup members lawful as a practical matter. Although modern prejudice is subtle,
modern prejudice harms stereotyped-group members, and the cumulative effect of
this discrimination is substantial.160
Moreover, the new standard alters legal narratives woven within the corpus
of summary judgment case law about whether modern prejudice exists in
American society. Iqbal operates at the pleading stage, before plaintiffs have
presented their evidence at the summary judgment stage. When federal courts
dismiss a case with prejudice, that case will never reach summary judgment. In
these cases, plaintiffs’ evidence will never come to light. If federal courts mainly
allow only claims of overt racism to survive dismissal, then, to the extent that
those claims are not settled earlier, courts will primarily adjudicate claims of overt
discrimination at summary judgment. As a result, the corpus of summary
judgment case law will emphasize narratives of blatant racism, rather than
narratives of how modern prejudice operates in American society. Over time, the
body of summary judgment case law will tell tales of overt racism, while excluding
narratives of modern prejudice. The bench and bar would, in turn, appraise cases
involving subtle racism as outliers, cases unlikely to prevail. The new standard,
hence, will have a limiting epistemological effect on federal antidiscrimination case
law.
Finally, this critical empirical examination illustrates one mechanism by
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010 (2011), available at http://
www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf; WILLIAM J. SABOL & HEATHER COUTURE, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2007 (2008), available at http://
bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=840; BRIAN D. SMEDLEY ET AL., UNEQUAL
TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (2002);
The Employment Situation: November 2012, U.S. DEP’T LABOR (Nov. 2012), http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/empsit.nr0.htm.
158. See Nier & Gaertner, supra note 156, at 207–18.
159. See Llewellyn, supra note 125, at 448 (“[A] right . . . exists to the extent that a likelihood
exists that A can induce a court to squeeze, out of B, A’s damages . . . . Accurate statement of a “real
rule” or of a right includes all procedural limitations on what can be done about the situation.”).
160. Nier & Gaertner, supra note 156, at 218.
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which colorblind ideologies and modern racism shape law and legal processes.161
As Ian Haney López has aptly said, “Law not only constructs race, but race
constructs law: racial conflicts distort the drafting and the implementation of
laws . . . .”162 The aversive racism framework predicts that, when legal decision
makers apply highly subjective legal standards in contexts where presuppositions
about race, racism, and stereotypes are salient, these malleable standards may
morph and change.163 Social psychologists, for example, have found that people
engage in casuistry to mask biased decision making from others and themselves by
altering standards to recruit acceptable criteria to justify decisions.164 Decision
makers cloak biased decisions in acceptable terms, shifting the weight and
emphasis of different criteria.165
For example, federal courts are reluctant to explain that they are dismissing
discrimination claims because they believe that discrimination is implausible.
Rather, federal courts say that they are dismissing these claims because plaintiffs
have failed to set forth allegations sufficient to form a prima facie case of
discrimination.166 In effect, the new pleading rule has shifted forward to the
pleading stage the prima facie burden that was once reserved for summary
judgment only.167 Federal courts, moreover, are shifting the quantum necessary to
plead discrimination claims, ratcheting upward the requirements of plaintiffs’
prima facie burden.168 At summary judgment, plaintiffs’ prima facie burden was
applied flexibly, yet federal courts are now applying the “same” standard at the
pleading stage restrictively.169 This is particularly jarring given that several U.S.
Courts of Appeal have expressed great frustration with the McDonnell-Douglas
framework.170
This, in turn, limits the ability of federal antidiscrimination laws to reach and
remedy modern prejudice for three reasons. In short, plaintiffs’ prima facie case
fails to capture the complex reality of discrimination in American society today,
such as discrimination on the basis of prototypical characteristics and
161. See Gómez, Understanding Law, supra note 37, at 488, 499.
162. Ian Haney López, Introduction to RACE, LAW AND SOCIETY, supra note 29, at xviii.
163. See, e.g., Devah Pager et al., Discrimination in a Low Wage Labor Market: A Field Experiment,
74 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 778–79 (2009).
164. See Norton et al., supra note 63.
165. See id.
166. See Quintanilla, supra note 5, at 43–50.
167. See Thomas, supra note 55, at 28–34.
168. See Quintanilla, supra note 5, at 43–50; Angela K. Herring, Note, Untangling the TwomblyMcDonnell Knot: The Substantive Impact of Procedural Rules in Title VII Cases, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1083
(2011).
169. See Thomas, supra note 55; Suzanne Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J.
728 (2011).
170. See Brady v. Office of Sergeant of Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he
prima facie case [aspect of McDonnell Douglas] is a largely unnecessary sideshow . . . spawning
enormous confusion and wasting litigant and judicial resources.”); see also Coleman v. Donahoe, 667
F.3d 835, 862 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring).
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intersectionality, and it underappreciates the impact that situations have in shaping
implicit bias. First, research shows that many Americans more readily apply racial
stereotypes to those who appear more stereotypically Black than to those who do
not.171 In this regard, employers may not discriminate against all African
Americans, but rather against those who are perceived to be more stereotypically
Black. When employers treat other Black employees in a non-discriminatory way,
this may tend to render discrimination against others who display more
Afrocentric features implausible. These cases would, therefore, likely be dismissed
at the pleading stage. Second, plaintiffs with overlapping and intersectional
identities tend to fare poorly under existing case law. For example, Black females
who claim race and sex discrimination appear to suffer disproportionately under
plausibility pleading.172 Third, the prima facie case underappreciates the situational
and contextual nature of discrimination. Implicit bias tends to be expressed
against stigmatized-group members in ambiguous situations with unclear
norms.173 Some employers may treat minority-group members well in some
situations, while discriminating against them in other situations. Again, the
problem is that the prima facie case is restrictive and underappreciates the many
forms of racism in American society today. The remedy against modern prejudice
is clouded, rendered far less certain, because of the interaction between a prima
facie standard that is underinclusive and Iqbal’s highly subjective pleading
standard.
CONCLUSION
We return to the beginning of our journey: might CRT benefit from more
robust engagement with empirical methods? In answering this question, I first
argued that social psychology offers both theory and methods to explore CRT. I
then drew on social-psychological theory and methods to conduct an empirical
legal study, which illustrated how infusing CRT with empirical legal methods
illuminates implicit bias in legal decision making and the process by which race
and law interact.
In so doing, this Article empirically investigated the highly subjective nature
of the new plausibility-pleading regime. An empirical study supported the
conclusion that the new standard serves as a context for aversive racism, implicit
171. See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black
Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 383, 383 (2006).
172. A follow-up analysis revealed that, under plausibility pleading, Black females’ claims of
race discrimination are being dismissed at a higher rate than Black males’ claims of race
discrimination. For example, I performed a logistic regression (“grant” versus “deny” and “grant and
deny”) of cases after Iqbal with the Black plaintiff’s gender as a predictor variable in the equation. This
analysis revealed a statistically significant effect of the Black plaintiff’s gender on the grant rate for
claims of race discrimination after Iqbal, odds ratio = 1.847, Wald  2 (1, N = 182) = 4.150, p = .04.
See also Best et al., supra note 31, at 1012.
173. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 88, at 52.
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bias, and lay theories of racism to operate against stereotyped-group members
who assert claims of discrimination.
Although this Article performed an empirical legal study on federal case law,
another important line of critical race empiricism will involve experiments. The
factorial design can be harnessed to test different rule regimes and to
experimentally induce and manipulate implicit bias, lay theories of racism, and the
activation of stereotypes. Experiments would, therefore, allow scholars to draw
causal inferences and to observe with relatively little difficulty whether the
independent variable causes changes in the dependent variable. Here, experiments
would allow scholars to evaluate whether rule regimes cause changes in levels of
implicit bias or lay theories of racism. With other designs, causal mechanisms
cannot be easily determined. Through random assignment to condition and
control variables, experiments allow inferences of causality. Experiments,
therefore, are an important empirical method for critical race empiricists to
harness when studying how rule regimes mediate the effect of stereotypes, implicit
bias, and racial ideologies.
Leslie Espinoza and Angela Harris have shown that legal stories have had a
powerful and profound effect on legal discourse: “Arguably, the most significant
impact of critical theory has been the reformation of legal analytical practices
through the use of stories.”174 Critical race empiricism should not, and need not,
supplant legal narratives as the means for exposing bias across the law. Instead,
critical race empiricism can be harnessed to supplement ongoing antisubordination
projects. For example, empirical legal methods can be deployed to expose the
disparate effect of seemingly neutral legal rules. I concur with Jerry Kang, who has
reasoned along a similar vein: “[T]his level of analysis cannot function alone, and
it needs supporting analysis from above and even below. What we need is
interpenetration, across all the layers of knowledge.”175 The need for concrete
study of Iqbal’s new subjective pleading standard is pressing. Here, CRT and
critical race empiricism could shape the debate by revealing compelling, concrete
examples, and a body of empirical evidence that shows why the need to change
pleading rules is urgent. Over time, critical race empiricists may reframe the
debate, shifting onto those who laud Iqbal the burden to justify the existence of a
legal rule that opens the courthouse door to implicit bias while closing the
courthouse door to stereotyped-group members harmed by modern prejudice.

174. See Angela P. Harris & Leslie Espinoza, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby—LatCrit Theory
and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1630 (1997).
175. See Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias and the Pushback from the Left, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1139, 1148
(2010).

